In the 1990s, the organization of means-tested support for low income families changed dramatically in the United States, with reductions in the availability of cash or in-kind support for non-working families, substantial increases in support for working families, and the devolution of program decision-making from the federal to the state level. This change was driven in part by a desire to provide stronger work incentives for low-income single mothers and avoid "welfare dependence", typically defined as long-term use of public assistance. Other frequently-mentioned reasons behind these program changes included a desire to allow more state discretion and impose fewer federal mandates, and a desire to reduce rising rates of non-marital childbearing.
Such concerns have not historically been part of the conversation about social assistance programs in many European countries. In fact, U.S. welfare programs have frequently been viewed by Europeans as too limited and too punitive, resulting in unacceptably high U.S. poverty rates. It is therefore somewhat surprising that some European policymakers have been deeply interested in the lessons of U.S. welfare reform and have even tried to adapt recent U.S. reform efforts to their own societies. For instance, the UK has adopted the Working Families Tax Credit, modeled on the U.S. EITC program. The Netherlands has moved to privatize parts of their disability, public employment and social insurance administration to increase efficiency (Evans, 2001 ).
Some German cities have even experimented with time-limited public assistance (Feist and Schöb, 1998) In this paper, I discuss the potential relevance of U.S. welfare reform to European concerns. The first section briefly summarizes the nature of the U.S. changes and their effects on behavior and outcomes among the low income population. The second section discusses potential lessons of interest to European observers. The last section presents several hypotheses about why the European and U.S. conversations on public assistance program design moved closer to each other over the 1990s.
I. U.S. welfare reform in the 1990s
Because so many people have written summaries of U.S. welfare reform, I use this section to only briefly outline some of the key changes occurring in the U.S. during the past decade.
1 Program changes occurred in two major areas, the design of cash assistance programs and the availability of work support programs. I discuss each in turn and then describe the rapid behavioral changes that occurred following these policy changes.
A. Changes in cash assistance and related programs.
In 1996, the U.S. passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). While controversial, the bill passed the Congress with a relatively high degree of bipartisan support. Among its major provisions were:
• Devolution of greater program authority to the states. PRWORA replaced the primary cash assistance program for low income families, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), with a block grant, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. This removed most federal eligibility and payment rules, giving states much greater discretion in determining the eligibility rules and design of cash support programs.
• Changes in financing. The TANF block grant provides a fixed amount of federal money to the states. This is quite different from the matching grant provisions under AFDC in which federal funds moved up or down with state funding.
• Ongoing work requirements. By 2002, at least 50 percent of all families receiving TANF support were required to be working or in work preparation programs.
States were given great discretion in designing and implementing such programs.
The law treated caseload reductions as similar to work, however. Thus, a state which reduced its caseload by 60 percent would meet its work requirement regardless of how many current or former recipients were actually employed. Because all states experienced large caseload reductions, the pressure to meet work requirements was much reduced.
In addition to these changes, PRWORA also encouraged states to implement programs that would reduce out-of-wedlock child bearing; it limited eligibility to Food
Stamps and Supplemental Security Income (the cash assistance program to low-income aged and disabled individuals); and it greatly restricted the access of legal immigrants to
all forms of means-tested public assistance.
States were required to replace AFDC with their own TANF-funded plans for cash assistance within a year of PRWORA's passage. Virtually all states took advantage of their newly-granted discretion to make major changes in their welfare programs, but different states made very different choices. By the early 2000s, U.S. public assistance policies across states had become extremely diverse. Seven of the most important program elements that vary greatly across states are described here.
Benefit levels. States have always been able to choose their own benefit levels and in some ways this part of the system has changed the least. There always were substantial differences in dollars paid to low-income families across different states. The primary trend in benefit levels in the 1990s has been inflation erosion (a trend visible since the early 1970s). The median benefit level across the 50 states fell from $480/month for a family of three in 1990 to $379 in 2000, almost entirely due to inflation erosion (both numbers in 2000 dollars).
Earnings disregards. Greater earnings disregards and child care dollars provide positive incentives to work.
Regardless of which program mix different states selected, they all pushed recipients into employment more rapidly than the old AFDC program.
B. Changes in other programs, particularly tax programs
While the changes enacted in 1996 with PRWORA were important, they are only one piece of the policy changes affecting low income families over the 1990s. Several other changes were also highly important.
First, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was greatly expanded in the early 1990s. The EITC is a refundable tax credit operating through the federal tax system that subsidizes low wage workers in low income families. Nonworkers receive no subsidy. Fourth, while the U.S. continues to lag European countries in the availability of health insurance to low income families, there were significant expansions in the availability of health insurance over the 1990s. All low-income children were eligible for the public health insurance program, Medicaid, by 1999. Women who left welfare were able to continue their Medicaid access for several years in many states. And at least a few states began to experiment to state-subsidized health insurance schemes for lowwage workers who did not receive health insurance through their employers.
C. What Effects Did These Changes Have?
The nature of support available to low income families within the United States changed dramatically over this past decade. The system evolved to provide substantial support for working low income families, with much reduced support for non-workers. Cash assistance became far less available, welfare recipients were pushed to find employment, the returns to low wage work rose, and the availability of work supports (child care and health insurance) increased to low income families.
Not unimportant, these changes look place at the same time as a major economic boom. The U.S. unemployment rate remained at or below 5 percent through much of the late 1990s. Wages among less skilled workers started to rise in 1995, for the first time since the late 1970s (Blank and Schmidt, 2001 ). This meant that the macroeconomy reinforced and supported the legislative changes over the 1990s.
As 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 There is some evidence of small income declines among a small share of the most disadvantaged, perhaps consistent with the expected effects of time limits and sanctions.
Our understanding of the full impact of these policy changes on the overall well-being of the low-income population remains quite limited, however. We have inadequate measures of the changes in work expenses, in work time versus time with children, or in housing and family situations.
A key question of interest has been how much of the changes in caseloads and employment were due to policy change versus a strong economy. In a review of the literature (Blank, 2002 , forthcoming), I discuss the real difficulties of doing this analysis in a credible way. The strong labor markets and the policy changes interacted in a variety of ways that make separating their impacts difficult. Most studies, however, suggest that both policy changes and economic changes were important over the 1990s. Neither of them, alone or together, fully explains the magnitude of change, however. There seems to have been a behavioral shift in the willingness of the low-income population to both enter and leave public assistance over this time period.
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II. Lessons for Europe from these reforms
A growing number of authors (including myself) have written papers describing the "lessons" of U.S. welfare reform for European observers. 6 Hence some obvious lessons have been already much discussed and I list them here only for completeness.
Economic expansion is a wonderful thing. It's very useful to have a strong macroeconomy if you want to implement work-oriented welfare reform. Economic growth remains the best way to stimulate job creation for low-wage workers. The U.S.
was able to move as far and as fast as it did on welfare reform in part because job availability was never an issue. Reasons behind the strength of the U.S. economy over the recent past decades have been much discussed in U.S./European contexts, with an ongoing debate about effective policies to alleviate high and persistent unemployment rates in many European countries. Changes in the behavior of U.S. welfare recipients over the late 1990s provides only one of many possible examples demonstrating the value of long-term economic expansion and job growth.
The EITC wage subsidy is an innovative and effective program. The EITC is
probably the most discussed U.S. policy innovation. The idea of work-conditioned benefits has spread, particularly among English-speaking countries. 7 The EITC design has several advantages over alternative wage subsidy schemes. First, because it is tied into the tax system it can be limited to low wage workers in low income families, rather than being paid out to all low wage workers. This makes it a much more efficient antipoverty tool than something like a minimum wage. Second, because it is paid only to workers (and employers are often uninformed about which workers get it and which do not) it should have few displacement effects or wage effects. Third, for the same reason, it should not have the "stigmatizing" effect that some worker subsidies appear to have created. 8 Research on the effects of the EITC (cited above) indicates that it has been important in increasing labor supply among less skilled women with children.
Welfare-to-work efforts can be effective. The U.S. has been a leader in pushing work requirements among public assistance recipients. States experimented with welfare-to-work programs throughout the 1980s and the 1990s in the United States, and many of these experiments were evaluated with highly credible randomized evaluations.
The result is a substantial body of evidence on the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programs in reducing welfare usage and public costs, and increasing labor supply. 
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The results are shown in Table 1 . When only positive work incentives are provided through an expanded earnings disregard, this has little effect on labor supply, consistent with earlier results. But the additional income provided by these disregards had strong income-increasing and poverty-reducing effects. Once mandatory work requirements are added to the program, then labor supply increases as well, but there is little further effect on income or poverty. In other words, the "stick" of mandatory work requirements increases labor supply, but by itself this has little effect on overall income as increases in earnings are offset by reduced benefits. But the "carrot" of greater earnings disregards provides an income enhancing effect. When used together, one gets the best possible result: increased work and earnings, along with reduced poverty. 14 While labor economists are likely to predict that education and training will make people better off in the long run, these evaluations challenge that assessment. Work-first LFA programs increased earnings and decreased welfare usage more quickly, while HCD programs cost more, particularly in the first year when women were training rather than working. But even three years out, after women from HCD programs had been in the labor market two years, HCD participants did not outperform LFA participants. This may suggest that the gains to experience among women who have been out of the labor market may be larger than the gains to education and training, at least initially. It is particularly interesting that employment outcomes did not seem significantly worse among less skilled participants or participants with identifiable barriers to work, such as child care or health problems. While these groups had lower labor force participation in general, their relative gains from work-first programs were as large as those of more advantaged women.
Of course, experience and education are both forms of human capital. Other work (Gladden and Taber, 2000) has indicated that even low wage labor force participants do receive wage increases over time with experience. But it is troubling that the education programs by themselves did not appear to produce much in the way of wage gains; the primary gains that occurred to women in these programs came when they entered the work force and acquired experience. For instance, while the education programs significantly increased the number of participants holding a high school equivalency degree, there was little evidence that this resulted in higher earnings or more work hours.
As it turns out, the over-time gains in labor force involvement and earnings are greatest in the "mixed" programs that assign some women to work-first and other women to training. This immediately raises a follow-up series of questions about who among the participants should be assigned to work first as opposed to training programs. But it also suggests that simply following a work-first strategy or a job training strategy for all participants may not be the most effective approach.
The lesson from this research is that work-first programs may be the right approach for some share of welfare participants. Many work-related efforts within public assistance programs in European nations have included a strong dose of education and training. While this may be appropriate for some participants, training programs cost more and their additional costs may not be necessary in order to successfully increase work and earnings among at least some public assistance recipients who have little recent job experience. Since the U.S. has moved almost entirely to a work-first model, perhaps the correct lesson to be stated here is that the U.S. should integrate more job training and education into its work programs, while European labor force programs should do less initial training and experiment more with work-experience efforts. Access to health care is also important, particular for those women and children with ongoing health problems. We have less evidence on the precise role loss of health insurance plays in women's difficulties in job holding, but anecdotal evidence suggests this can be important.
Hence, a key "lesson" from the U.S. is that job availability is NOT the only requirement for a successful transition to work. European nations that provide substantial support to working mothers (such as Sweden) are in a better situation than the U.S. to deal effectively with job-holding problems that relate to the availability of child care
and/or health care. Even if some of these nations may face more difficulties in helping women locate jobs, they have an advantage in having other work supports already in place. Hence, they may be able to concentrate more of their program resources on the job creation and location issue, while in the U.S. more program resources have had to go into other work supports. European nations that provide little support to working mothers (such as Germany) need to worry about this lack of support if thinking about work incentives within social assistance programs.
Both the U.S. and Europe, however, need to be more aware of the barriers to work faced by some public assistance recipients. U.S. research suggests that between onequarter and one-third of the caseload may face multiple barriers to work, including physical or mental health problems that limit their work capacity, substance abuse problems, issues around domestic violence, very low skills, English-language problems, or child health problems. 15 Welfare recipients with depression problems are emerging in a number of studies as a particularly vulnerable and difficult-to-assist group. Danziger (2001) indicates that one-third of current and recent recipients meet the criteria for at least one of six major psychiatric disorders. 16 Experimental programs in the U.S. indicate that working with these more disadvantaged populations requires more resources, more time, and more personal attention for these women to become truly "work ready."
On the other hand, there is growing evidence that a substantial number of these women can work at least part time. Employment rates among women with multiple work barriers are NOT zero. Danziger, et. al. (2000) indicate that women with 2-3 barriers have a 62 percent probability of working at least 20 hours; women with 4 to 6 barriers have a 40 percent probability of work. Differently designed welfare-to-work programs and more phased-in employment requirements may make sense for this population.
The difficult issues raised by these programs are three fold, and the U.S. has yet to find effective solutions to any of them: First, there is a need to identify persons with these difficulties at an early stage and direct them into alternative programs. A worstcase scenario might occur when these women are treated like all others, fail to respond fully to work requirements, and are sanctioned off public assistance without hope of any future support. Second, efforts to assist these populations are expensive and require a greater budgetary commitment. This is made more difficult by the fact that some highly disadvantaged persons may not be very "politically" sympathetic, that is, they may be substance abusers or their mental health problems may make them very difficult to work with. Third, we still know too little about what programs will help women who face real barriers to employment. It is simply difficult to treat substance abuse, to reduce domestic violence, or to help workers cope with depression or lifelong learning disabilities.
Research on the U.S. welfare reform efforts has clearly identified these groups as special problems. Both U.S. and European public assistance efforts need to do a better job of finding ways to cope with these more disadvantaged public assistance recipients.
Behavioral patterns can be changed. Those who supported U.S. welfare reform in the mid-1990s argued that we needed to change the "culture" of welfare, that is, to change the set of expectations about appropriate behavior. In the U.S., this meant not only giving women an expectation that long-term welfare receipt was neither available nor desirable, but also changing expectations around marriage and non-marital childbearing.
There is a growing body of evidence that the U.S. has been at least partially successful doing just this. The evidence is of two sorts. First, there is evidence of a discontinuous change in behavior away from welfare receipt somewhere around the mid1990s. Even the most detailed models of caseloads have large unexplained negative declines in the late 1990s. Welfare usage seemed to decrease far more than anyone expected. In some ways this was a mirror of the late 1960s, when welfare usage soared far beyond what any change in program parameters would have predicted. Moffitt (1992) indicates this is due to an increase in take-up rates among the eligible population.
We have only limited evidence on take-up of welfare among the eligible population over the late 1990s. With 50 highly-diverse state programs it is extremely difficult to estimate eligibility in national data sets. There is clear evidence that take-up of two welfare-related programs (Food Stamps and Medicaid) appears to have dropped (Greenstein and Guyer, 2001 ). Given the ongoing public attention to "getting tough"
with welfare and the implementation of mandatory work requirements and time limits, it would not be surprising if a number of potentially eligible recipients were choosing to avoid welfare or to leave it as soon as possible. (In fact, time limits encourage eligible persons who have other forms of support to use them instead rather than using up ones' lifetime limit of welfare.) All of this suggests that the U.S. welfare-to-work reform effort has been successful at discouraging participation among some set of eligibles who have other options.
The second piece of evidence for widespread behavior changes is the research that suggests welfare reform is affecting family formation and fertility. This evidence is still scattered, and indeed, one would not expect to see rapid changes in these demographic indicators. But a growing number of studies indicate that cohabitation has increased and nonmarital fertility has decreased.
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The lesson in all of this is that attitudes and expectations can be changed. We have few models within economics to help us understand and track this process, but it appears that fewer people are willing to enter or stay on welfare and these changes are greater than the marginal changes in program parameters might predict. This is consistent with arguments that preferences around work ethics and social norms may be endogenous and can be altered by policy choices (Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull, 1999.) In Europe, where there is substantial concern with "dependency" in a variety of areas -such as disability programs or early retirement as well as public assistance or A different economic environment and more need for job creation. The U.S. has been particularly fortunate in an economy with widespread job availability over the past decade. Even in the recent economic slowdown unemployment has stayed below 6 percent. In a less job-rich environment, more European countries have to worry about job availability. The design of a work-oriented public assistance system may be less effective (and will certainly be more expensive) if public sector job creation is needed in order to create work slots of public assistance recipients.
III. Why Are European and U.S. Welfare Discussions Moving Closer?
I close this paper with a few musings on why European interest in U.S. welfare reform efforts is as strong as it is. As noted at the beginning, there is surprisingly strong policy interest in U.S. welfare reform by European policy observers. This is reflected in the growing collection of European-based academic research focusing on potential disincentives and costs of welfare-state programs. 18 To a U.S. researcher, long used to mild sarcasm from European colleagues about the punitive and limited nature of U.S. public assistance programs, this is quite striking.
Let me suggest at least three possible reasons for converging interests around questions of welfare reform. 19 First, European nations have been facing more budgetary limits in recent decades. In part, this is due to slower economic growth rates. In part, it is due to demographic changes that are producing an aging population and growing strains on budgets. In part, it is due to the economic effects of monetary union within Europe, which has forced nations to pay closer attention to budget deficits. The effects of a large number of transitioning economies in eastern Europe, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has also had an impact on many European nations, especially Germany.
It is exactly a tighter budget environment in which concerns about welfare dependency and over-use of public assistance programs might be expected to arise.
With tight budgets and growing population demand for assistance, "get tough" policies to reduce welfare rolls become more attractive.
The long-term slower macroeconomy has also affected the European conversation around welfare. As more and more analysts have become convinced that European labor markets are too inflexible and over-regulated, this has produced broad-scale interest in ways to introduce more efficiency into the economies. Not surprisingly, concern with disincentive effects of assistance programs are one response.
Second, the emerging economic cooperation within the European Union has produced concern about the response to national social policies if labor becomes more mobile across Europe. While little progress has been made in EU conversations about social policy convergence, there is nervousness about the extent to which more generous programs in some countries will induce migration. The "race to the bottom" -a longdiscussed concern in the U.S. --argues welfare benefits will be underprovided if there is a threat of "welfare migration" across states. Each state lowers benefits below what they would prefer in an isolated world to avoid being the most generous state (which would induce in-migration of poor populations.) Within Europe, these concerns include both migration from poorer parts of the EU as well as migration from eastern Europe and the middle east.
Third, racial issues are becoming more prominent in Europe. More than one observer has noted that lower benefits and greater concern about behavior among the poor in the U.S. is due to the diversity of the U.S. population. New immigrant groups were always poorer in the U.S., and suspicions about each wave of sequential immigrants focused on keeping them from taking too much from native workers -including overusing U.S. welfare benefits. It is not accidental that, following two decades of very high immigration rates in the U.S., the 1996 legislation cut immigrants off from federally-funded public assistance programs.
Perhaps even more important than recent immigrant flows, the problem of race in
America and the role of African Americans have deeply affected the public view of welfare. For instance, even though black women have historically been a minority of welfare recipients, public depictions of welfare recipients are disproportionately black.
Alesina, Galser and Sacerdote (2001) suggest that race is a primary reason for American "exceptionalism" with regard to its more limited system of public support.
Europe has become much more diverse in recent decades as well. Tensions around the presence of immigrants have been much discussed, particularly the influence of these tensions on the rise of right-wing politicians. Both the growth in immigrants (non-natives) as well as the fact that many immigrants are also persons of color has led to a growing number of racially-tinged incidents throughout Europe. If indeed it is race and immigration that has led to U.S. "exceptionalism" in social policy, then it is perhaps not surprising that European social policy concerns have begun to look more like historical U.S. concerns over the past decade.
IV. Conclusions
The U.S. welfare reforms are still very much an experiment-in-progress. We are just now finding out how effectively these redesigned and work-oriented programs operate in a slower economy. We are just beginning to observe a number of states enforcing time limits on women. We have only limited data on how working single parents and their children --who in an earlier time might have received welfare --are faring. One might care about the impact of these reforms not just on the adult workers but also on their children and the communities in which these workers live. Any change as dramatic as the U.S. welfare reform will necessarily produce some who benefit and some who lose. The recent strong economy has somewhat masked our ability to analyzes these distributional gains and losses in the years immediately after reforms were enacted.
Many of the results that emerge from U.S. public assistance changes are clearly useful only to particular environment in which they occur. But some of the key lessons from the U.S. -about the value of work incentives (positive and negative), the usefulness of work experience for many public assistance recipients, and the need to pay attention to issues beyond jobs availability (particularly for single mothers) -may be useful to other countries interested in moving participants from public assistance into work.
Most of all, the U.S. experience is compelling because of it demonstrates a case where dramatic changes occurred in relatively short periods of time. Both welfare programs and behavior of welfare recipients changed more substantially than any U.S.
observer probably would have predicted in the mid-1990s. This type of systemic change is unusual in the policy world; most change tends to be on the margins. A primary reason for European policy-makers to study U.S. welfare reform is simply to try and understand the conditions under which such systemic change can occur. Whether these conditions can be duplicated in other national environments remains an open question.
